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TAX EXEMPTION
substantive issue that the conflict of competing constitutional rights has
been faced and resolved.
To admit that discrimination may not be wrongful in some circum-
stances is not a retreat from principles of equality, for the same retreat
can be, and arguably is, being made4' under the colors of state action.
Rather it is a move toward honesty; a move for a realistic look at the
basic issues that must in fact underlie the Court's decisions.
CRAIG Jr. TILLERY
Constitutional Law-Tax Exemption for Widows Upheld over
Sex Discrimination Challenge
In recent years the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause and the fifth amendment's due process clause' have been used
by women to challenge statutes that allegedly discriminated against fe-
males on the basis of sex. A few of the cases have reached the United
States Supreme Court, and several statutes have been found unconsti-
tutional although no definitive test or rule has emerged from the de-
cisions.2 In Kahn v. Shevin3 the Court faced a different type of sex
discrimination case. Instead of a female plaintiff claiming that she was
being denied equal protection, a man brought the suit, charging that
a Florida tax exemption discriminated against males. The Court, in
48. Note, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Licensing at a Private Club Is Not
Sufficient State Action Under Equal Protection Clause, 77 DIcK. L. Rnv. 157 (1972);
Note, Racial Discrimination by Private Club Held Not State Action Despite State Issued
Liquor License and Accompanying Regulations, 41 FODH&M L. REv. 695 (1973); Note,
Moose Lodge v. Irvis: The Undecided Decision, 8 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 251 (1973);
Note, State Liquor License Granted To a Private Club Adhering To Discriminatory
Guest Practice Does Not Constitute "State Action" in Violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 2 TEXAs S.U.L. Rnv. 338 (1973); Note, Licensing and Regulation of Private
Clubs by State Liquor Control Board Does Not Constitute State Action, 4 TExAs TncH.
L. REV. 211 (1972).
1. The due process clause in the fifth amendment has been employed by the Su-
preme Court as an equal protection clause applicable to the federal government; e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
2. See text accompanying notes 25-30 infra.
3. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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a brief opinion by Justice Douglas, upheld the validity of the exemp-
tion, saying that, since the statute's purpose was to ameliorate past
discrimination against women, the sexual distinction bears a "'fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' "4
Mel Kahn, a Florida widower, applied for a property tax exemp-
tion under section 196.191(7) of the Florida Statutes. The statute
granted widows a five hundred dollar exemption but made no similar
provision for widowers.' His application was therefore denied. Seek-
ing a declaratory judgment in the State courts,6 Kahn claimed that,
since the statute established a classification based on sex, it violated
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The Florida Su-
preme Court held that the exemption was valid.7 Quoting Reed v.
Reed,8 the State court found that, since women as a class earn less
money than men, the sex distinction drawn in the statute "'rest[s]
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation.' "" The United States Supreme Court
then took the case on appeal.10
Justice Douglas, speaking for six members of the Court," rejected
both of -the traditional equal protection tests, strict scrutiny and rational
relationship.' 2 Instead he looked at the statute in light of "the finan-
cial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other
State"'" and applied the same "fair and substantial basis" test that the
State supreme court had applied. The Court noted that the exemption
"cushion[s] the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which
4. Id. at 355, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
5. The statute challenged by Kahn read as follows:
The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(7) Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500.00) to every
widow and to every person who is a bonafide resident of the state and has lost
a limb or been disabled in war or military hostilities or by misfortune.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.191(7) (Supp. 1971), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202
(1972). It should be noted that this exemption is not a new statute enacted in response
to the recent push for equal rights for women. The Court noted that the 1885 Florida
constitution had a property tax exemption for widows. 416 U.S. at 352.
6. The suit was filed in the Dade County Circuit Court, which found the statute
unconstitutional.
7. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973).
8. 404 U.S. 71 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 26-29 infra.
9. 273 So. 2d at 73.
10. Kahn's appeal to the Court was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
11. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart
joined in the opinion of the Court.
12. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.
13. 416 U.S. at 353.
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that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."14  In addition,
the Court noted that in the area of -taxation it had "long held that
'.. . the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing
lines. . .' "'- Because of this leeway' and the leeway it was willing
to give the states to remedy past discrimination, the Court affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court's decision.
There were two separate dissents. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, would have held that the statute had to meet the strict
scrutiny test. Justice Brennan, however, was willing to hold that the
test could be met when "the purpose and effect of the suspect classifi-
cation are ameliorative. ... 1l7 He stated that "the statute serves the
compelling state interest of achieving equality for [women]."' s Never-
theless, Justice Brennan believed that the exemption was uncon-
stitutional because it was "overinclusive."' 9  Justice White, in a sepa-
rate dissent, also believed that the strict scrutiny ,test should be applied.
Unlike Justice Brennan, he stated that Florida had failed to show a
compelling state interest that would justify the classifications.20
Prior to Kahn the precedent on the issue of discrimination against
women was uncertain. The traditional test applied by the Court in
equal protection cases has been one of either strict scrutiny or rational
relationship.2' The strict scrutiny test applies to several judicially cre-
ated suspect classifications22 and fundamental rights.23 It requires the
defending party -to show a compelling governmental interest for the
14. Id. at 355.
15. Id., quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359
(1973).
16. A tax statute, of course, cannot be drawn along invidious, e.g., racial, lines.
In general, however, much leeway is allowed. E.g., Lenhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
17. 416 U.S. at 359.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 360. See note 41 infra.
20. 416 U.S. at 361.
21. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of equal protection
cases see Developments in the Law-Eual Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
22. The suspect classifications include: (1) alienage or nationality, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
(2) race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and (3) perhaps illegitimacy, see Go-
mez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
23. The fundamental rights include: (1) interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); (2) voting and related rights, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); (3) procreation,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and perhaps marital privacy, cf. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438-
(1972).
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Court to uphold the statutory classification. If the distinction drawn
by the statute involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right,
the Court applies the rational relationship test in which the inquiry
centers on whether the distinction bears a rational relationship to the
purpose of the statute.2
4
Equal protection cases involving women do not fit into these tra-
ditional tests. While the older sex discrimination cases were judged
under the rational relationship test and the statutes were generally up-
held, 5 since 1971 several cases have swung the pendulum to the other
side. The most important of these have been Reed v. Reed 0 and
Frontiero v. Richardson. In Reed the Court unanimously28 held that
an Idaho statute giving preference to males over females in the choos-
ing of an administrator for a decedent's estate violated the fourteenth
amendment. The Court did not say that sex was a suspect classifica-
tion, but it did seem to require more than a rational relationship. 20 In
Frontiero, which invalidated a federal statute making it easier for a
serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent than for a servicewoman
to claim her husband similarly, four of the nine Justices80 contended
that sex was a suspect classification. Thus when Kahn brought his
challenge before the Court, classifications based on sex were being
scrutinized more strictly than under the rational relationship standard,
24. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (classification based on
wealth).
25. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a law making it more
difficult for women to serve on a jury than men); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (upholding a law making it very difficult for women to become bartenders).
But see Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. - (1975) (strongly disapproving the Hoyt case).
26. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
28. The vote was 7-0. Justices Powell and Rehnquist had not been appointed to
the Court.
29. The Court claimed not to be applying a new test. The sexual distinction, how-
ever, was drawn for administrative efficiency, and the case has widely been read as re-
quiring more than merely a rational relationship because administrative efficiency should
meet that test. E.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. Rlv. 1, 29-37 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Sex Discrimination-Su-
preme Court Plurality Declares Sex a Suspect Classification, 48 TurL. L. REv. 710, 714
(1974). The Court itself admitted that the distinction had "some legitimacy." 404 U.S.
at 76. Some writers think this "midway test" applies in several equal protection areas.
See Gunther, supra.
30. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White joined in the plurality opinion
saying that sex classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Justice Powell, in
an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, concurred in the result
on the basis of Reed without reaching the issue of whether sex should be a suspect
classification. Justice Stewart, relying on Reed, concurred in the result. Justice Rehn-
quist was the lone dissenter.
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but a majority of the Court was not committed to the strict scrutiny
standard.
Only Justice Douglas of the four Court members who stated in
Frontiero that sex is a suspect classification held that the Frontiero
plurality's decision and reasoning were not applicable to the facts of
Kahn. He was able, however, to carry a majority of the Court.81 This
distinction drawn by Douglas between Kahn and Frontiero is the sig-
nificant aspect of Kahn. Unlike Frontiero in which the statute dis-
criminated against women, the Court dealt "here with a state tax law
reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the finan-
cial impact of spousal loss upon 'the sex for whom that loss imposes
a disproportionately heavy burden. '32  Therefore, although the case
involved a sex classification, it did not involve discrimination against
women.33  Instead it was designed to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination. Justice Douglas, then, seems willing to apply a less strict
constitutional standard when the statute discriminates in favor of rather
than against women. Hence the focus of the Douglas approach is on
the purpose of the statute.
A relevant case in analyzing Douglas' position is the so-called re-
verse discrimination case, DeFunis v. Odegaard.34 In the reverse dis-
crimination decisions, purpose is also an important focal point.3 5 In
DeFunis the preferential admissions policies 6 at the University of
Washington Law School were at issue. DeFunis, a white applicant,
challenged the admission procedure on fourteenth amendment equal
31. Note that the other five members of the Kahn majority have never said that
sex is a suspect category. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
32. 416 U.S. at 355.
33. Note that whether a classification does or does not discriminate against
women is frequently far from clear. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(majority opinion), with id. at 497 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), where the Court avoided the question by deciding that
a school board rule requiring all pregnant teachers to take a leave without pay at the
end of the fourth month of pregnancy violated due process.
34. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
35. "Racially neutral" assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a
district court may be inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the contin-
uing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location
of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an
artificial racial separation. When school authorities present a district court
with a "loaded game board," affirmative action in the form of remedial altering
of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly non-discriminatory assignments.
Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
36. These policies called for separate consideration of minority applicants' qualifi-
cations. The qualifications of the minority applicants were, in general, lower than those
of other applicants. Therefore, separate consideration of these applicants meant that
minority applicants were competing against each other rather than against the other,
generally better-qualified applicants.
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protection grounds, contending that by favoring minority groups, the
university discriminated against whites. The Supreme Court did not
reach the merits of the case, dismissing it on the ground of mootness.87
Justice Douglas, however, in his dissenting opinion, did discuss the re-
verse discrimination issue and the importance of the purpose of the
policies of admission.
DeFunis and Kahn are similar in several respects. Both involved,
in Douglas' view, suspect categories, race in the former and sex in the
latter.3 8 Both cases involved policies designed to remedy past dis-
crimination. The two opinions indicate that the Court should not apply
-he strict scrutiny test to a statute that has as its purpose the ameliora-
tion of the effects of past discrimination against a group. Although
the application of two different standards to the same classification may
at first appear inconsistent,"9 a more complete analysis suggests that
such application is the most logical one.
To illustrate, assume, first, -that the Court condemns a certain type
of discriminatory policy and requires a state to show a compelling state
interest to continue to discriminate; secondly, that the state, recog-
nizing the error of its past behavior, seeks through legislation to remedy
its effects. 40  It would be contradictory for the Court to require reme-
dial legislation to meet the stringent strict scrutiny test. Instead, the
Court should give some latitude to the state method since the state is
attempting to correct the effects of what the Court has termed its
earlier unlawful discrimination. 41
37. A discussion of the mootness issue in DeFuns is bevo-d the scope of this note.
The Court's action vacated the Wash;ngton Sunreme Court's decision in favor of the
constitutionality of the university's policies. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507
P.2d 1169 (1973).
38. The Court as a whole has not accepted that view with respect to sex. See note
30 and accomnanying text supra.
39. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351. 360-62 (1974) (White. 3., dissenting).
40. The fact that the stafute involved in Kahn was passed prior to the Frontlero
line of cases does not affect this analysis.
41. Cf. REA v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). On this point the majoritv and
Justice Brennan differ. Brennan maintained that the statute must be drawn narrowly
enough to meet the strict scrutiny test. He believed that such a statute can be constitu-
tional only when a state "demonstratresl that the challenged legislation serves overrid-
ing or compelling interests that cannot be achieved either by a more carpoftllv tailored
legislative classification or by the use of feasible less drastic means." 416 U.S. at 360
(emphasis added). Brennan's objection to the Florida exemption was apparently the
place at which the State drew the line that determined who would benefit from the ex-
emption. Florida believed that all women had suffered economic discrimination and
that, therefore, all deserved to get the exemption. Brennan, on the other hand, consid-
ered only "those widows for whom the effects of past economic discrimination against
women have been a practical reality," i.e., the non-wealthy, should benefit from the stat-
ute. Id. However, Douglas said: "We have long held that '. . the States have large
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Justice Douglas, however, did not clearly state in Kahn how much
latitude he was willing to give the states. He stated -that the widow
exemption was constitutional "'if the discrimination is founded upon
a reasonable distinction .. . "'-42 which implies that he is willing to
hold the state to merely the rational relationship standard. A closer
examination of the opinion, however, reveals that this apparently is not
true. The quoted language appeared only at the end of the opinion
where Justice Douglas quoted from prior tax cases and followed his
more thorough discussion of why the exemption "'rest[s] upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation.' " 43  Reference to his dissent in DeFunis clearly in-
dicates that the rational relationship test will not suffice in such cases.
In that opinion, Justice Douglas was very critical of basing law school
admissions solely on race. He stated that "racial factors [should]
not militate against an applicant or on his behalf."' 4  Rather than ex-
pressing a willingness to give states the latitude to remedy past dis-
crimination in any rational manner, Douglas said that the fourteenth
amendment requires states to proceed more carefully in cases in which
invidious discrimination may result from the states' policies. "The
Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers,
not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought
to be organized. '45  These ideas are certainly not congruous with the
broad rational relationship standard.
Still, Justice Douglas did not require that a compelling state inter-
est be shown. In DeFunis he said that if race were the sole deter-
mining factor, the strict scrutiny test would apply. He concluded,
though, that, if it were shown that the effect of racial discrimination
was the factor being considered, the admissions policy would be con-
stitutional; in other words, if the law school gave a preference to minor-
ities not solely because they were minorities but because their back-
ground and culture might have adversely affected their law school
leeway in. . .drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of tax-
ation.'" Id. at 355, quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
359 (1973). For other cases supporting the proposition that it is the legislature's job,
and not the Court's. to draw lines see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
42. 416 U.S. at 355, quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
528 (1959).
43. 416 U.S. at 355, quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920) (emphasis added).
44. 416 U.S. at 336.
45. Id. at 342.
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admission tests scores, the admissions policy would not violate the equal
protection clause.46 Similarly, in Kahn, Douglas documented his con-
clusion that the real purpose of the tax exemption was not simply to
prefer females over males but to remedy the effects of economic dis-
crimination against women in this country.47
Douglas applies a test somewhere between strict scrutiny and ra-
tional relationship that he calls a "fair and substantial relationship" test.
The term was used in Reed v. Reed,48 a case -that was widely read to
impose a standard somewhere between the two more traditional equal
protection tests.49  The use of such a test recognizes the importance
of encouraging states to legislate in order to provide remedies for past
discrimination, and yet, seeks to guard the rights of those against
whom such legislation necessarily discriminates.
CONCLUSION
Kahn establishes that all forms of sex discrimination are not neces-
sarily constitutionally invalid. The case also establishes that the pur-
pose of the legislature in enacting a statute based on a sex classification
is a relevant factor in the determination of its constitutionality. 0  Read
in conjunction with Douglas' dissent in DeFunis, it could have a signifi-
cant impact on the equal protection clause. Studied in that light, it
appears to formulate a "fair and Substantial basis" test for statutes in-
volving sex discrimination that result in reverse discrimination, and its
effects may spill over into other areas of reverse discrimination. The
test involves two inquiries-first, about the purpose of the statute, and
secondly, about the effects of the statute on those who suffer discrimi-
nation because of it.51 The first question requires an examination of
46. Id. at 340-41., Justice Douglas would have remanded the case for a new trial
to give the university a chance to prove that its purpose was to remedy discrimination.
Id. at 335-36, 344.
47. Id. at 353-54.
48. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
49. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
50. Justice Douglas' opinion clearly notes the importance of the fact that the stat-
ute works to remedy past discrimination rather than to discriminate further against
women. 416 U.S. at 355.
51. Justice Douglas appears to have been influenced to some extent by prior rea-
soning of Justice Marshall. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
520-21 (1970) (dissenting opinion). In Dandridge Justice Marshall named as impor-
tant factors in all equal protection analyses "the character of the classification in ques-
tion, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the gov-
ernmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support
of the classification." Id. at 521. In Kahn Justice Marshall was a dissenter, joining
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what the state is trying to accomplish. In Kahn the statute sought to
ease the effects of economic discrimination. Douglas' opinion in
DeFunis, however, clearly states that, if the state tries to go beyond
remedying the effects of past discrimination, the statute will be struck
down. The second question asks whether the effect of the statute will
be invidiously to discriminate against anyone. This part of the "fair
and substantial basis" test cannot be positively defined. It turns pri-
marily on the facts of each case. Factors such as the significance of
the right being asserted 2 and whether one person will be denied a
position or opportunity because of -the preference 3 are examples of
relevant considerations." In general, the second inquiry of the test
examines what harm will result from the reverse discrimination.
Although it is loosely defined, this two-pronged test is sufficiently
clear for states to understand that the Supreme Court is willing to give
them some leeway in drafting statutes designed to rectify past discrimi-
nation against women.55  The test allows states to pass such remedial
legislation as long as that legislation does not invidiously discriminate
against men. It is important ,to note that by giving them this latitude
in the opinion of Justice Brennan. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra. For a
view similar to Justice Marshall's see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Black,
J.).
52. Kahn, for example, involved the relatively insignificant right to a tax exemp-
tion; cf. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973). Two impor-
tant points should be noted here. First, even though Justice Douglas speaks of the spe-
cial nature of leeway in tax cases, his much more extensive discussion of remedial stat-
utory purpose clearly has import beyond cases of discrimination caused by tax exemp-
tions. The significance of the right is only one factor to be considered in the "fair and
substantial basis" test. Secondly, the fact that Kahn is both a tax case and a sex dis-
crimination case is only one of several distinctions between Kahn and DeFunis. There-
fore the holding in Kahn in no way will control the next DeFunis-type racial reverse
discrimination case that reaches the Supreme Court; and how much spillover into re-
verse discrimination fields other than sex the Kahn opinion will have is purely specula-
tive. It would be unfair, however, not to note the many similarities between the cases,
e.g., the three justices who wrote opinions in Kahn (plus the other dissenting justice)
all consider both race and sex to be suspect; see note 29 and accompanying text supra.
For legal commentaries on how the Court should decide a racial reverse discrimination
case see, e.g., Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in
Law Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1973); O'Neil, Preferen-
tial Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80
YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
53. In DeFunis, for example, Justice Douglas noted the "bumping" effect on white
applicants that admissions of minorities would have. 416 U.S. at 332-33.
54. The most important factor that could arise under this prong of the test would
be the denial of a fundamental right, see note 22 and accompanying text supra, to mem-
bers of the group discriminated against, e.g., giving minority group members two votes
each. This question was raised by the facts of neither Kahn nor DeFunis.
55. Depending upon the extent of spillover from Kahn, the same may be true of
statutes designed to rectify past discrimination against many minority groups.
1975] 559
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to enact such laws, the Court will allow the states to experiment with
different ways to rectify the effects of past discrimination."0
A. W. TURNER, JR.
Criminal Procedure-No Right to Counsel on Discretionary
Appeal
In Douglas v. California" the United States Supreme Court held
that the failure to appoint counsel to represent an indigent criminal ap-
pellant in his "one and only appeal" of right2 violates the fourteenth
amendment. The extension of the Douglas right to counsel to indi-
gents seeking discretionary state and federal review of their convictions
led to conflict in the circuits. 3 Resolution came in Ross v. Mo!fitt.4
56. Three cautionary statements are apposite here. First, as Justice Brennan
pointed out. the Florida exemption is neither mandatory nor automatic. That is, a wi-
dow, in order to receive the exemption, must apply for it. Whether or not a mandatory
reverse discrimination statute will be invid;ous is rot decided by Kahn. 416 U.S. at 359
n.5. It seems, however, that the distinction would make little difference. It is up to
the state legislature to draw the lines, see note 41 supra, and if it decides to remedy
the discrimination against all women who have suffered it rather than merely those who
apply for the exemption, then it is not the function of the Court to tell the state it can-
not draw its line there.
Secondly, the continuing validity of the statute involved in Kahn if and when the
effects of past discrimination are erased is a different question which is beyond the scope
of this note.
Thirdly, the effect that the passage of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment might
have on legislation such as Florida's tax exemption for widows is beyond the scope of
this note. There has been speculation on the issue, though. See, e.g., Brown, Emerson,
Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 903-05 (1971).
1. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
2. Id. at 357 (emphasis in original). The term "appeal of right" refers to review
by an anpellate court of the merits of a claim guaranteed by a state statute or constitu-
tion. The term "discretionary appeal" or "discretionary review" refers to review where,
although there exists a statutorv or constitutional right to seek review, the appellate
court may decline to hear the appeal in its discretion.
3. Compare Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), with United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) and Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965). See also United States ex rel. Coleman
v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1963).
4. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
